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Watching Big Brother: A Citizen’s Right
to Record Police
By Vincent Nguyen*
Due to growing technological advances and the ubiquity of
mobile phones, it has become increasingly common for citizens to
use these devices to photograph and record events. Though largely
uncontroversial, when used to record public police activity, some
citizens have been arrested and charged under state wiretapping
or eavesdropping statutes. Over time, various circuit courts have
held that this right to record public police actions is a protected
activity. Most recently, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower court decision, which held that this
act of recording is unprotected, thereby exemplifying how circuit
courts are split on the issue. Given the importance and timeliness
of this issue, this Note agrees with the majority of circuit courts
and argues that recording public police activity receives
constitutional protection. Part I discusses the First and Fourth
Amendment protections surrounding this right to record police
activity, further supplemented by the common law right to acquire
information. Part II reviews the current circuit split, providing a
brief synopsis of the various cases dealing with this issue. Part III,
siding with the majority of circuit courts, argues that the citizen
right to record is entitled to constitutional protection and
advocates for its legality as a matter of public policy.

*

Managing Editor, Fordham Environmental Law Review; J.D. Candidate, Fordham
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INTRODUCTION
“I can’t breathe.”
– Eric Garner
The now-infamous nearly three-minute video shows the
escalating interaction between Eric Garner and the police, with
Garner repeating the phrase “I can’t breathe” eleven times.1 The
video is difficult to watch for a number of reasons, primarily
because Garner was later pronounced dead at the hospital.2 While
the video provides a holistic view of the interaction, some
unrecorded details are of importance, namely (according to
witnesses) that police arrested Garner twice that year near the same
spot for selling untaxed cigarettes, and that Garner flailed his arms
to resist frisking and avoid detention.3 Though this information
provides a more comprehensive view of the interaction, these
events are not necessarily pertinent to the events of Thursday,
July 17, 2014.4
If police forbade citizens from recording them while they
perform their official duties in public, society would remain
uninformed of such harrowing police interactions. Videos are
important evidentiary devices because they can provide a complete
and accurate record of events, including dialogue, body
movements, and other contextual details. According to the
American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), video “creates an
independent record of what took place in a particular incident, free
from accusations of bias, [incorrect testimony], or faulty memory.
1
See ‘I Can’t Breathe’: Eric Garner Put in Chokehold by NYPD Officer – Video,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2014/dec/04/icant-breathe-eric-garner-chokehold-death-video [https://perma.cc/59Z9-SMT4]; see also
Christopher Mathias, Eric Garner Said ‘I Can’t Breathe’ [Eleven] Times — Now
Activists Are Making [Eleven] Demands in His Name, HUFFPOST (Dec. 11, 2014),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/11/eric-garner-protestsdemands_n_6308956.html [https://perma.cc/5VAH-TZP9].
2
See Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y.
TIMES (June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garnerpolice-chokehold-staten-island.html [https://perma.cc/J47G-M48F].
3
See id.
4
See Ford Fessenden, New Perspective on Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES
(June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/12/03/us/2014-12-03-garnervideo.html [https://perma.cc/BN75-U5C3].

640

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVIII:637

It is no accident that some of the most high-profile cases of police
misconduct have involved video and audio records.”5 Most
importantly, video recordings, as opposed to witness accounts, do
not erode over time.6 Eyewitness testimony is fickle, and all too
often, shockingly inaccurate.7 Furthermore, “[b]ystander videos
provide different perspectives than police and dashboard cameras,
portraying circumstances and surroundings that police videos often
do not capture. Civilian video also fills the gaps created when
police choose not to record video or withhold their footage from
the public.”8 In addition to a video’s evidentiary value, video
recording can assist law enforcement, ranging from Justice
Department investigations of civil rights violations to exonerations
of police officers accused of wrongdoing.9 In other words,
bystander videos can not only protect citizens from inappropriate
police activity, but also protect police from allegations
of misconduct.10
In a recent federal circuit court decision, Akins v. Knight,11 the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower court
decision,12 which held that citizens do not have the right to record
5

Filming and Photographing the Police, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/freespeech/photographers-rights/filming-and-photographing-police [https://perma.cc/U5Z6WQZE] (last visited Jan. 28, 2017) (defending the constitutional right to take
photographs and video in public and committing itself to defend this right).
6
See Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the
Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 10 (2007) (describing the
rapid decline in reliability of memory over time); see also Richard P. Conti, The
Psychology of False Confessions, 2 J. CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT & WITNESS PSYCHOL. 14,
22–23 (1999) (describing the effect misleading post-event information can have on
recounting the original information).
7
See Commonwealth v. Martin, 850 N.E.2d 555, 570 (Mass. 2006) (Cordy, J.,
dissenting) (revealing seventy-seven percent of wrongful convictions were due to
mistaken eyewitness testimony).
8
Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2017).
9
See Robinson Meyer, The Courage of Bystanders Who Press ‘Record’, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/04/the-courage-ofbystanders-who-press-record/389979/ [https://perma.cc/9NW9-6HF2].
10
See Maya Wiley, Body Cameras Help Everyone – Including the Police,
TIME (May 9, 2017), http://time.com/4771417/jordan-edwards-body-cameras-police/
[https://perma.cc/794Z-WFCG].
11
863 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir. 2017).
12
See id. at 1088; see also Akins v. City of Columbia, No. 2:15-CV-04096-NKL, 2016
WL 4126549, at *17 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 2, 2016).
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public officials.13 In the lower court decision, the appellant argued
that he was stopped from filming in a police precinct lobby in
2011.14 The U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Missouri referenced an Eighth Circuit decision in declaring that
“neither the public nor the media” enjoys a right of equal access or
special First Amendment rights.15 In contrast to the U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits16—all of which held that the Constitution guarantees the
right to film public officials in public settings, sometimes subject
to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions17—the Eighth
Circuit ruled that citizens have no right to film politicians or police
in public.18 The Eighth Circuit incorrectly ruled on this matter and
should align itself with the majority of circuit courts, not only to
provide uniformity, but also to provide citizens with greater
protections in accordance with their constitutional rights.
This Note argues the First Amendment protects the citizen’s
right to record police officers in public spaces.19 The common law
right to know information further supports the right to record
police activity.20 Part I outlines the existing constitutional basis,
specifically the First and Fourth Amendments, and the common
law which protects citizens from prosecution when recording
police activity. The majority of federal circuit courts have held that
both this constitutional and common law right to record public

13

The circuit court affirmed the district court ruling, see Akins, 863 F.3d at 1088,
which held that appellant “has no constitutional right to videotape any public proceedings
he wishes to,” Akins, 2016 WL 4126549, at *17.
14
See Akins, 2016 WL 4126549, at *17.
15
Id. (citing Rice v. Kempker, 374 F.3d 675, 678 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[N]either the public
nor the media has a First Amendment right to videotape, photograph, or make audio
recordings of government proceedings that are by law open to the public.”); see also infra
notes 145–58 and accompanying text.
16
See infra Section II.A.
17
See Stephen Wyse, [Eighth] Circuit Rules No First Amendment Right to Film Police
in Public, WYSE L. FIRM, P.C. (Aug. 9, 2017), http://wyselaw.com/index.php/2017/08/09/
8th-circuit-rules-no-first-amendment-right-to-film-the-police-in-public/
[https://perma.cc/KD4S-XMFN].
18
See Akins, 863 F.3d at 1088 (affirming the district court decision that held that
citizens have no right to film politicians or police in public).
19
See infra Section I.A.
20
See infra Section I.C.
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police activity exists.21 Part II describes how the most recent
Eighth Circuit decision departs from convention, thus creating a
split at the circuit court level. This Note asserts that as a result, the
U.S. Supreme Court should address this issue of public
significance, and subsequently hold this right to exist. Part III
establishes that recording is a form of speech, entitled to First
Amendment protection. This First Amendment designation
protects the recorder when disseminating the recording in the
future, and from statutes attempting to criminalize recordings.22
I.
LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR THE RIGHT TO RECORD
This Part details the constitutional protections afforded to the
recording of public police actions, further supported by the
common law right to know information. The First Amendment, in
conjunction with the Fourth Amendment, protects the citizen’s
right to record public police actions.23 First Amendment
jurisprudence suggests there is an affirmative constitutional right to
gather and receive information on matters of public interest.24 This
right to access information prohibits federal and state governments
from interfering.25 In addition, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
indicates that police officers have no reasonable expectation of
privacy while performing their duties in public, indicating citizens
can legally record these activities.26 Finally, American common

21

See, e.g., Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 687–90 (5th Cir. 2017); ACLU
of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 594–602 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651
(2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82–85 (1st Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Cumming,
212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); see also infra Section II.A.
22
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
23
See infra notes 28–42 and accompanying text.
24
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). The right to receive information
about public officials is necessary to inform and enable political discourse in a
democracy. See id. Further, the First Amendment protects the right to disseminate or
publish recordings of public significance, even if another party illegally intercepted the
recording. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 519, 534–35 (2001).
25
See infra notes 43–55 and accompanying text.
26
See, e.g., Hornberger v. Am. Broad. Cos., 799 A.2d 566, 592–95 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2002); Commonwealth v. Henlen, 564 A.2d 905, 906–07 (Pa. 1989); State v.
Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1357–58 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); see also infra notes 56–62 and
accompanying text.
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law protects the act of recording public police activity, allowing
citizens to create and inspect public records.27
A. First Amendment
Because the First Amendment prohibits the government from
limiting public information, citizens can record the police
performing their duties in public.28 The right to gather and receive
information about public officials informs and enables political
discourse.29 The nation’s founders prioritized transparency and
information regarding governmental affairs, because it allowed for
the election of responsible political representatives.30 In fact, the
Founding Fathers intended the First Amendment to protect
discussions of politics and government.31 Recordings are
commonly used for the preservation and dissemination of
information, and are “included within the free speech and free
press guaranty of the First [Amendment].”32 Similarly, the
Supreme Court recognized that a First Amendment right to gather

27

See infra Section I.C. (explaining how the common law right to know information
supports recording police activity).
28
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”). In interpreting the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court has recognized the right to receive information and
ideas. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976); Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). Even though this right is not absolute, newsgathering
is “entitled to [F]irst [A]mendment protection, for without some protection for seeking
out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.” Turner v. Lieutenant Driver,
848 F.3d 678, 688 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 808
(5th Cir. 1982)); see also Davis v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sch. Bd., 78 F.3d 920, 928 (5th
Cir. 1996). Finally, there is “an undoubted right to gather news from any source by means
within the law.” Turner, 848 F.3d at 688 (quoting Houchins, 438 U.S. at 11).
29
See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 599–600 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 651 (2012).
30
See id. Furthermore, “speech and press freedom includes, by implication, ‘some
protection’ for [individuals] gathering information about the affairs of government[,
which] is consistent with the historical understanding of the First Amendment.”
Id. at 599.
31
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); see also N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (this constitutional right reflects our “profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open”).
32
Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
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and disseminate public information exists,33 including the public
activities of police officers. In a quick succession of cases in the
1980s,34 the Court decided that the First Amendment right to
access information was tantamount to the right to communicate,
applying strict scrutiny toward any law trying to circumscribe
this right.35
1. Constitutional Right to Gather and Receive Information
The Supreme Court has held that gathering and receiving
information is included within the First Amendment’s
protections.36 In 1969, the Court held the “right to receive
information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is
fundamental to our free society.”37 Not only do citizens have the
right to receive information and ideas, but the Supreme Court has

33

Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). This notion is discussed in more
detail in the next Section. See infra notes 37–42 and accompanying text.
34
See infra note 44 and accompanying text. See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2417, 2418–24 (1996) (restating briefly the strict scrutiny doctrine and the Supreme
Court’s method of evaluating restrictions on speech).
35
Strict scrutiny is the highest level of judicial review that a court employs to
determine the constitutionality of a law, which applies to content-based speech
restrictions. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (subjecting
content-based speech restrictions to strict scrutiny analysis); see also Skinner v. State of
Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (attesting to the importance with
which strict scrutiny is applied); Legal Info. Inst., Strict Scrutiny, CORNELL LAW SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny [https://perma.cc/H3EQ-7EVK] (last
visited Oct. 26, 2017) (“Strict scrutiny is a form of judicial review that courts use to
determine the constitutionality of certain laws. To pass strict scrutiny, the legislature must
have passed the law to further a ‘compelling governmental interest,’ and must have
narrowly tailored the law to achieve that interest . . . . [This] represents an approach in
which a presumption of constitutionality is shed in favor [of] more exacting
judicial review.”).
36
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681 (indicating that gathering of information is protected
by First Amendment and explaining that “without some protection for seeking out the
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated”); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564 (1969) (determining that the First Amendment protects information and ideas);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (holding First Amendment
protections extend to right to receive literature); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82–83
(1st Cir. 2011).
37
See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 563 (citations omitted).
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also recognized the right to gather news and information.38 This
right to gather news is not limited to members of the professional
press, but extends to the general public as well.39 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that video recordings are a
protected medium of speech under the First Amendment.40
Ultimately, the underlying principles of the First Amendment
protect discussions of matters of public interest.41
2. Right of Access
The right of access is an affirmative right to know information,
requiring the government to avoid intervening in the acquisition of
such information.42 However, recognition of this right of access is
relatively new43: The Supreme Court first acknowledged its
38

Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (“There is an undoubted right to
gather news ‘from any source by means within the law . . . .’” (quoting Branzburg,
408 U.S. at 681–82 (1972)).
39
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684 (stating that the press is not afforded any special
right or “access to information not available to the public generally”); see also Glik,
655 F.3d at 83–84.
40
First Amendment speech protections encapsulate audiovisual recordings as speech.
See Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (holding that movies are a protected
form of speech); see also ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2012)
(holding that freedom of press and freedom of speech necessitate the protection of
making audio or audiovisual recordings), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012); infra note
172 and accompanying text.
41
See Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 689 (2017). The First Circuit
explained, “[t]he filming of government officials engaged in their duties in a public place,
including police officers performing their responsibilities, fits comfortably within [basic
First Amendment] principles.” Glik, 655 F.3d at 82.
42
See David Mitchell Ivester, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 109, 109 (1977); see also Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and
Beyond: Considering the Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 95, 102–03 (2004) (drawing a distinction between “negative structuralism,”
which prevents the government from interfering with the dissemination and consumption
of speech, with “affirmative structuralism,” which requires the government to provide
access to its proceedings or information in its possession).
43
The Court held a right to access federal information beginning with Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia in 1980. 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). Conversely, the statutory
right to access information originates with the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) of
1966. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). FOIA generally requires federal agencies and
government-controlled entities to release a record when a member of the public submits a
request for its release, unless the document falls under an enumerated exemption. See id.
§ 552(a)(1)(A)–(E) (listing provisions related to certain mandatory disclosures); id.
§ 552(b)(1)–(9) (listing exemptions to the Act’s disclosure requirements); see also David
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existence in 1980 in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,44
where, after a series of mistrials in a Virginia murder case, the
judge closed the trial to the public and the media.45 Two reporters
blocked from accessing the courtroom challenged the judge’s
actions.46 The Supreme Court held the First Amendment played a
structural role in requiring an open government.47 Seven of the
eight justices ruled that the First Amendment guaranteed the press
and the public a right of access to the government.48 Although the
case directly concerns the public’s right to attend a criminal trial,
the opinion’s theoretical implications for the public’s right to know
are much broader.49 Similar to the rights of association and
privacy, the right of access is implicitly guaranteed in the
enumerated rights of the First Amendment.50
Richmond Newspapers left unclear what standard the lower
courts should apply when determining whether a presumptive First
C. Vladeck, Information Access—Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of Federal
Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1797 (2008) (“The right of access conferred
by FOIA could not have been more broadly conceived. It allows ‘any person’ . . . to
request any record . . . on any subject . . . .”).
44
See 448 U.S. at 580. After the Richmond Newspapers decision, the Court quickly
decided three additional First Amendment right of access cases, extending the right of
access to pretrial hearings, sexual assault trials, and voir dire proceedings. See PressEnter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (extending the right to
preliminary hearings); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 510–13
(1984) (extending the right to voir dire proceedings); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court for Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 610–11 (1982) (extending the right to sexual assault
trials); see also Mary-Rose Papandrea, Under Attack: The Public’s Right to Know and the
War on Terror, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 35, 38 (2005). Since the mid-1980s, however,
the Court has left further development of this doctrine to the lower courts. See Eugene
Cerruti, ‘Dancing in the Courthouse’: The First Amendment Right of Access Opens a
New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 263–69 (1995) (discussing the holdings of Globe
Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. 596, Press-Enter. Co., 464 U.S. 501, Press-Enter. Co., 478
U.S. 1, as well as lower court right of access cases).
45
See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 559–63.
46
See id.
47
See id. at 580 (holding that the First Amendment guarantees the public’s right to
attend criminal trials) (Burger, J., plurality op.).
48
See id. Justice Powell did not take part in the decision. Id. at 581. Justice Rehnquist
was the lone dissenter. See id. at 604.
49
See generally Papandrea, supra note 44, at 44–48 (tracking the right to know
doctrine from its origin in Richmond Newspapers through subsequent case law).
50
See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 579–80. Free speech is given enumerated
protection by the First Amendment, which expressly states “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Amendment right of access attaches. As a result, the Supreme
Court adopted a two-prong history-and-logic test derived from
Justice Brennan’s Richmond Newspapers concurring opinion.51
This inquiry considers two factors: (1) whether the proceeding has
traditionally been open to the public; and (2) whether public access
to the proceeding at issue would “play[] a significant positive
role.”52 If the right of access attaches, the court may only restrict
access to the proceeding if it determines that there is a “compelling
governmental interest” which necessitates closure, and that this
closure is “narrowly tailored” to serve such an interest.53 By
applying strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court clearly indicates that
the public’s First Amendment right of access receives the same
legal protections as the right to communicate.54
B. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment relates to the act of recording police
activity because it protects an individual against unreasonable
searches and seizures, thus creating the foundation for privacy
law.55 The Supreme Court originated this significant body of case
law from Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion56 in Katz v. United
States, which details an individual’s “reasonable expectation of
privacy.”57 Though originally in a concurring opinion, subsequent
51

The Court points primarily to the Globe Newspaper decision, specifically, those
sections of which relied upon Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Richmond Newspapers.
See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1986) (citing Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 605–06 (1982)); Globe
Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605–06 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589
(Brennan, J., concurring)); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 597–98 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (concluding with a summation of the history-and-logic test).
52
See Press-Enter., 478 U.S. at 8.
53
See Press-Enter., 464 U.S. at 510 (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606–07).
54
See id.; see also Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606–07. In his Globe Newspaper
dissent, Justice Burger argued that the right of access should not be treated the same as
the right to disseminate information or to discuss ideas publicly, and that the court should
instead ask whether the restriction is “reasonable,” balancing the competing interests of
access and closure. See 457 U.S. at 615–16 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
55
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–62 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (noting the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable expectation
of privacy).
56
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
57
See id. Charles Katz used a public pay phone booth to communicate illegal gambling
bets between Los Angeles, Miami, and Boston. See id. at 348 (majority opinion). The

648

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVIII:637

case law adopted this two-prong test to evaluate when a
governmental intrusion constitutes a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment.58 The first prong considers whether a person
demonstrates an actual “subjective expectation of privacy”;59 and
the second prong examines whether the “expectation [is] one that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”60 The first prong
is a factual inquiry, while the second prong is a question of law.61
C. Common Law Right to Know Information
Americans have a vital interest in acquiring information about
their government because it fundamentally affects their lives.62 The
common law right to information “antedates the Constitution.”63
The general common law right to information is a remnant of the
English common law that allowed citizens to inspect records.64
This common law right to know information is measured by
evaluating the requester’s interests in seeking the information.65
When reviewing the case law applying this common law right
in various U.S. courts since the nation’s founding, it is unclear
precisely what a plaintiff must initially show to trigger a right to
information.66 Some courts have followed the English rule that
FBI recorded his conversations via an electronic eavesdropping device attached outside
of the phone booth he was in. See id. Though lower courts convicted Katz on the basis of
these recordings, he challenged the conviction, arguing that the recordings violated his
Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 348–50.
58
See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Hornberger v. Am. Broad. Cos., 799 A.2d 566, 592 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)
(citing United States v. Clark, 22 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 1994)).
62
See Ivester, supra note 42, at 109–10.
63
Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1993).
64
See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1069 (3d Cir. 1984) (“The
Supreme Court [has] recognized that [the] English common law right of access was
transferred to the American colonies.”). For a discussion of the underpinnings of the
English common law right see, for example, Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N.W. 749, 750
(Mich. 1928); State v. Williams, 75 S.W. 948, 958 (Tenn. 1903); State ex rel. Ferry v.
Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 334–36 (N.J. 1879).
65
See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597–98 (1978) (discussing the
operation of the U.S. common law right to information).
66
There is a dearth of recent common law right to information cases because various
FOIA statutes are typically relied on for access, and when the common law right is
litigated it is usually in the context of judicial records. See Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S.
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requires plaintiffs to show some special need or interest in the
information before claiming this right.67 However, a substantial
line of cases have denounced this approach, and held that the
policies of public access and open government are sufficient
without any showing of need.68
While some U.S. courts require a special or proprietary need
for information before the right exists, both federal and state case
law require no significant showing of need beyond having an
actual interest in the information.69 Courts focus on traditional
American democratic ideals, reasoning that all citizens have a right
“of free access to and public inspection of public records.”70 In
Nixon v. Warner [Communications, Inc.],71 “[t]he Supreme Court
squarely addressed the common law right to information.”
Sentencing Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897, 902 (“[T]he growth of the common law has been
stunted in recent years by the spread of comprehensive disclosure statutes . . . . Since the
Watergate cases, the common law right of access has been invoked in federal courts with
some frequency, but still almost always in cases involving access to court documents.”).
67
See, e.g., Ferry, 41 N.J.L. at 334 (“The documents in question are of a public nature,
and the rule is that every person is entitled to the inspection of such instruments, provided
he shows the requisite interest therein.”);] Daluz v. Hawksley, 351 A.2d 820, 823 (R.I.
1976) (“[T]his court recognizes the common law right of inspection by a proper person or
his agent provided he has an interest therein which is such as would enable him to
maintain or defend an action for which the document or record sought can furnish
evidence or necessary information.” (emphasis in original)); see also Hanson v.
Eichstaedt, 35 N.W. 30, 31 (Wis. 1887).
68
See, e.g., Boylan v. Warren, 18 P. 174, 176 (Kan. 1888); Hawes v. White, 66 Me.
305, 306 (Me. 1876); Burton v. Tuite, 44 N.W. 282, 285 (Mich. 1889); State ex rel. Cole
v. Rachac, 35 N.W. 7, 8 (Minn. 1887); MacEwan v. Holm, 359 P.2d 413, 417 (Or. 1961).
69
See, e.g., Daluz, 351 A.2d at 823; see also William Randolph Henrick, Public
Inspection of State and Municipal Executive Documents: ‘Everybody, Practically
Everything, Anytime, Except . . . ’, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1105, 1108–09 (1977) (noting
that while many courts have relaxed the interest requirement, “[n]evertheless, absent a
statute, the requirement of an interest in the document itself generally remains a
prerequisite to inspection”).
70
Burton, 44 N.W. at 285; see also Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N.W. 749, 750 (Mich.
1928) (“If there be any rule of the English common law that denies the public the right of
access to public records, it is repugnant to the spirit of our democratic institutions. Ours is
a government of the people.”); Laurie Romanowich, Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark:
No Access to Taped Evidence, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 257, 261 (1982) (“[T]he common law
right, like the [F]irst [A]mendment, creates ‘an informed and enlightened public
opinion.’” (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc.,
435 U.S. 589 (1978))).
71
435 U.S. at 597 .
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Although the Court ultimately denied the request for information,
it offered a detailed examination of the common law right to
information’s historical origin, and affirmed that a common law
“right to inspect and copy public records and documents” exists.72
These underlying First and Fourth Amendment principles indicate
the existing constitutional basis for the citizen’s right to record.
II.
CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE RIGHT TO RECORD
This Part details the current circuit split regarding the citizen’s
right to record police officers performing their official duties in
public. While the majority of circuits addressing this issue held a
fundamental First Amendment right to record police activities in
public exists, subject to reasonable restrictions—commonly time,
manner, and place—the most recent federal circuit to rule on this
issue reached the opposite conclusion.73 Most circuit courts
recognize the right as clearly established with the surrounding
factual circumstances affecting whether this right exists in a
particular police interaction.74 As such, the average citizen has
little prior notice of whether their filming is protected by the First
Amendment. The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits adjudicated cases specifically addressing the right to film
public police activity;75 whereas the Fourth Circuit only
commented on this issue in passing.76 In opposition, the Eighth
Circuit recently held that citizens do not have this recordation

72

See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597.
See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding “the right to
film . . . may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions”); see also
ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 607 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that the police are
generally permitted to take “reasonable steps to maintain safety and control,” even if they
have incidental effects on an individual’s exercise of the First Amendment right to
record), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012).
74
See, e.g., Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting the importance that
the subject filmed is “police carrying out their duties in public,” which is a factual
inquiry) (quoting Glik, 655 F.3d at 82).
75
See e.g., Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 689 (5th Cir. 2017); Alvarez,
679 F.3d at 594; Glik, 655 F.3d at 82; Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 251
(3d Cir. 2010); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000);
Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1995).
76
See, e.g., Szymecki v. Houck, 353 F. App’x 852, 853 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
73
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right.77 The following sections detail the relevant factual
circumstances and holdings of the aforementioned circuits.
A. Circuits Holding a Qualified Recordation Right Exists
The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
issued rulings to protect the right of bystanders to record police
actions in public, subject to reasonable limitations.78 In total,
“[t]heir collective jurisdictions now amount to exactly half of the
[United States,] and roughly [sixty] percent of the
American population.”79
1. The First Circuit
In August 2011, the First Circuit Court decided Glik v.
Cunniffe,80 after many instances of police arresting or charging
people for recording police under Massachusetts’s wiretapping
statute.81 In 2007, police arrested Simon Glik for recording the
arrest of another young man on the Boston Commons park grounds
on his cell phone.82 After verifying Glik recorded the arrest, one of
the officers arrested Glik for unlawful audio recording in violation

77

See Akins v. Knight, 863 F.3d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir. 2017).
See infra Sections II.A.1–6. See, e.g., Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 607 (determining that
reasonable orders to maintain safety and control, which have incidental effects on an
individual’s exercise of the First Amendment right to record, may be permissible); Glik,
655 F.3d at 84 (exercising the right to film may be subject to reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions).
79
Matt Ford, A Major Victory for the Right to Record Police, ATLANTIC (July 7, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/a-major-victory-for-the-right-torecord-police/533031/ [https://perma.cc/6BCX-2RC9].
80
655 F.3d 78.
81
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Manzelli, 864 N.E.2d 566, 568 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007)
(discussing Jeffrey Manzelli, who was convicted for illegal wiretapping and disorderly
conduct after recording police during a protest on Boston Commons); see also
Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 964 (Mass. 2001) (discussing Michael Hyde’s
prosecution under Massachusetts’s wiretapping statute for recording police during a
traffic stop); Daniel Rowinski, Police Fight Cellphone Recordings: Witnesses Taking
Audio of Officers Arrested, Charged with Illegal Surveillance, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 12,
2010), http://archive.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/01/12/police_
fight_cellphone_recordings/ [https://perma.cc/6UWS-XFN7] (describing Jon Surmacz’s
arrest after recording police breaking up a party).
82
Glik, 655 F.3d at 79–80.
78
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of Massachusetts’s wiretap statute.83 Glik subsequently filed suit,
claiming the charge violated his First and Fourth Amendment
rights.84 The First Circuit answered the narrow question of whether
a constitutional right exists to record police publically performing
their official duties.85 The court held “though not unqualified, a
citizen’s right to film government officials, including law
enforcement officers, in the discharge of their duties in a public
space is a basic, vital, and well-established liberty.”86 The court
further held that “[g]athering information about government
officials[,]” which “can readily be disseminated to others,” protects
and promotes the First Amendment’s goals by “promoting ‘the free
discussion of governmental affairs.’”87
On May 23, 2014, three years after Glik was decided, the First
Circuit again addressed the right to record police in public in
Gericke v. Begin.88 Carla Gericke, was charged under New
Hampshire’s wiretapping statute89 after she pretended to record a
late-night traffic stop of her friend in another vehicle.90 Shortly
thereafter, she was arrested and charged, and as a result, sued the
city.91 The First Circuit held that private citizens have the First
Amendment right to film “police officers performing their duties in
public.”92 The court extended the holding in Glik regarding an
individual’s right to film a public police interaction, to also
83

See id. at 80. The Massachusetts wiretapping statute prosecutes any individual who
“willfully commits an interception, attempts to commit an interception, or procures any
other person to commit an interception or to attempt to commit an interception of any
wire or oral communication . . . .” MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(c)(1)
(West 2018).
84
See Glik, 655 F.3d at 79 (bringing “suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that his
arrest for filming the officers constituted a violation of his [constitutional] rights”).
85
Id. at 82.
86
Id. at 85.
87
Id. at 82 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)); see supra
notes 37–42 and accompanying text (emphasizing the importance of gathering and
disseminating information).
88
753 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014).
89
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (2017).
90
Gericke, 753 F.3d at 2–3.
91
Id. at 3–4.
92
See id. at 7. A traffic stop, regardless of the additional circumstances, is still a public
police act. See id. at 7. Therefore, “a traffic stop does not extinguish an individual’s
right to film.” Id.
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encompass a citizen’s right to record to traffic stops.93 However,
the court approved of future reasonable restrictions when justified
by the circumstances.94
2. The Third Circuit
The two plaintiffs in Fields v. City of Philadelphia,95 Richard
Fields and Amanda Geraci, filed lawsuits that led to the Third
Circuit’s ruling, though their claims originated because of two
separate incidents.96 In September 2012, Geraci filmed officers
arresting a protester during an anti-fracking demonstration.97
During the filming, “[a]n officer abruptly pushed Geraci . . .
against a pillar,” which effectively “prevented her from . . .
recording the arrest.”98 In 2013, Fields used his iPhone to
photograph “police . . . breaking up a house party across the
street.”99 An officer arrested Fields and searched his phone.100
Though neither plaintiff was charged, both filed 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims, alleging the individual police officers, and by extension the
City of Philadelphia, violated their constitutional rights.101 Because
of the similarity in their claims, the court consolidated their suits
for discovery, dispositive motions, and trial.102
93

See id. at 7–8. The First Circuit held that “First Amendment principles apply equally
to the filming of a traffic stop and the filming of an arrest in a public park.” Id. at 7. “In
both instances, the subject of filming is ‘police carrying out their duties in public.’” Id.
(quoting Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011)). In doing so, the court
extended Glik: “[I]t is clearly established in this circuit that police officers cannot,
consistently with the Constitution, prosecute citizens for violating wiretapping laws when
they peacefully record a police officer performing his or her official duties in a public
area.” Id. at 5.
94
See id. at 8 (finding “[t]he circumstances of some traffic stops, particularly when the
detained individual is armed, might justify a safety measure—for example, a command
that bystanders disperse—that would incidentally impact an individual’s exercise of the
First Amendment right to film”); see also supra note 73 and accompanying text.
95
166 F. Supp. 3d 528 (E.D. Pa. 2016). Notably, the district court’s opinion contains a
more detailed factual record and analysis than the Third Circuit. See generally id.; see
also infra note 96 and accompanying text.
96
See Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 356 (3d Cir. 2017).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 166 F. Supp. 3d 528, 533 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
102
See id. at 528.
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The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
held the plaintiffs did not have the First Amendment right “to
observe and record police officers absent some other expressive
conduct,”103 citing the lack of Third Circuit or Supreme Court
precedent.104 The court noted that because neither plaintiff spoke
during the incidents, their act of recording would only be protected
if understood as expressive conduct.105 The court declined to
expand First Amendment protection to the act of observing and
recording, finding there was no “authority compelling this broad a
reading of First Amendment precedent.”106 Accordingly, the court
declined “to create a new First Amendment right for citizens to
photograph officers when they have no expressive purpose such as
challenging police actions.”107 Fields and Geraci appealed the
ruling to the Third Circuit, which rejected the lower
court’s reasoning.108
The Third Circuit disagreed with the lower court, holding the
First Amendment protects citizens recording public police
activity.109 In its ruling, the Third Circuit emphasized the
importance of “[a]ccess to information regarding public police
activity,” also alluding to the importance of the First Amendment
in the discussion of governmental affairs.110 However, the Third
Circuit also upheld the First Circuit’s imposition of
reasonable restrictions.111
103

Id. at 533.
See id. at 534–35 (noting the Third Circuit “has never held speech unaccompanied
by an expressive component is always afforded First Amendment protection”).
105
See id. at 535–37.
106
Id. at 535.
107
Id. at 542.
108
See Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 355 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[T]his case is
not about whether Plaintiffs expressed themselves through conduct. It is whether they
have a First Amendment right of access to information about how our public servants
operate in public.”).
109
Id. at 355–56.
110
See id. at 359.
111
See id. at 360 (“We do not say that all recording is protected or desirable. The right
to record police is not absolute. ‘[I]t is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions.’” (quoting Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010)));
see also supra note 73. Time, place, and manner restrictions are the typical restrictions
that a court applies to the act of recording, see supra note 73 and accompanying text,
however, discussion of these restrictions is outside the scope of this Note.
104
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3. The Fifth Circuit
In 2017, the Fifth Circuit addressed citizen surveillance of
police officers in Turner v. Lieutenant Drive.112 While standing on
public property, the defendant, Phillip Turner, attempted to record
a police station when two officers approached him and asked him
to identify himself.113 After Turner refused to provide his
identification, he was arrested.114 At the precise point of his arrest,
the Fifth Circuit held Turner did not have the “clearly established”
right to record police activity, thereby entitling the officers to
qualified immunity.115 However, the Fifth Circuit held this right
exists moving forward,116 affirmatively holding that citizens have
the right to record police officers performing their public duties.117
The court, referring to the decisions of other circuits, agreed that
the right to film police promotes First Amendment principles, but
opined that the right was subject to similar limitations, such as
time, place, and manner restrictions.118
4. The Seventh Circuit
In 2012, in American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v.
Alvarez,119 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the right to record police
in public.120 At issue was a statute enacted by the Illinois General
Assembly in 1961 criminalizing the use of electronic devices
which could “record all or part of any oral conversation without
[the] consent” of the speakers.121 The law was subsequently
“amended . . . to require the consent of ‘all of the parties’ to the
112

See 848 F.3d 678, 683 (5th Cir. 2017).
Id.
114
See id. (“Turner asked the officers whether he was being detained, and Grinalds [one
of the officers] responded that Turner was being detained for investigation and that the
officers were concerned about who was walking around with a video camera. Turner
asked for which crime he was being detained, and Grinalds replied, ‘I didn’t say you
committed a crime.’ Grinalds elaborated, ‘We have the right and authority to know who’s
walking around our facilities.’”).
115
Id. at 685.
116
See id. at 687–90.
117
See id.
118
See id. at 689.
119
679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012).
120
See id. at 608.
121
Id. at 587.
113
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conversation.”122 Here, the ACLU, a civil liberties organization,
filed a pre-enforcement action against the State of Illinois,
requesting declaratory and injunctive relief to bar enforcement of
the eavesdropping statute.123
The ACLU proposed a police accountability program to better
hold law enforcement officials accountable for their actions.124
This plan included plans to publish recordings of police officers
speaking at an audible volume while performing their duties in
public.125 Based on its familiarity with the statute, and before
implementation of the plan to collect recordings, the ACLU filed
the pre-emptive suit against Alvarez to protect their videographers
from prosecution.126 The Seventh Circuit recognized that a
citizen’s right to record police activity is protected via “the First
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech and press rights,”127 after
extensively reviewing the First Amendment jurisprudence.128 The
Seventh Circuit held the Illinois eavesdropping statute burdens
individual speech and free press rights, based on “the expansive
reach of the statute[;]”129 and concluded by granting a preliminary
injunction to prevent its application against the ACLU and
its agents.130

122

Id.; see also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/14-2(a)(1) (2012).
See Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 588.
124
See id.
125
See id.
126
See id. at 586.
127
See id. at 595 (finding that “[a]udio and audiovisual recording are media of
expression commonly used for the preservation and dissemination of information and
ideas” and are therefore protected by the First Amendment’s free speech and free
press rights).
128
See id. at 589, 595–603. The court of appeals noted at the outset that the State of
Illinois had staked out an “extreme position,” rejecting the notion that openly recording
the speech of police officers while they performed their duties in public was not protected
by the First Amendment. See id. at 594.
129
Id. at 595 (noting “the statute sweeps much more broadly, banning all audio
recording of any oral communication absent consent of the parties regardless of whether
the communication is or was intended to be private” (emphasis in original)).
130
See id. at 608.
123
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5. The Ninth Circuit
In Fordyce v. City of Seattle,131 the Ninth Circuit reversed a
grant of summary judgment to police officers who allegedly
assaulted a marcher who attempted to film police interference with
a public protest.132 On August 5, 1990, Jerry Edmon Fordyce, a
participant in the protest, attempted to videotape the public march
“presumably for broadcast on a public access channel.”133 Though
recording the overall protest, Fordyce also recorded the activities
of police officers monitoring the protest.134 When “attempt[ing] to
videotape sidewalk bystanders,” Fordyce was arrested for violating
a Washington privacy statute.135 Because Fordyce’s appeal was
based on an alleged assault and battery incident, the Ninth Circuit
did not engage in a thorough discussion of the First Amendment
right to record police.136 However, the court briefly noted the
existence of the right to record matters of public interest (i.e., the
police in a public setting), albeit in dicta.137
6. The Eleventh Circuit
In 2000, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that a broad First
Amendment right to photograph or videotape police exists.138
James and Barbara Smith sued the City of Cumming, Georgia
alleging that the police prevented Mr. Smith “from videotaping
police actions.”139 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia granted summary judgment for the city.140 However,
the court of appeals reversed, holding that “[t]he First Amendment
protects the right to gather information about what public officials
do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of
public interest.”141 Though the opinion is short, the Eleventh
131

55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995).
See id. at 438, 442.
133
Id. at 438.
134
Id.
135
Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030 (2017) (forbidding the recording of
private conversations without the consent of all participants).
136
See Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 438–42.
137
See id. at 440.
138
See Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000).
139
Id. at 1332.
140
See id.
141
Id. at 1333.
132
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Circuit recognized the First Amendment right to record police,
similarly subject to reasonable restrictions.142 Nonetheless, the
court dismissed the complaint, determining that the Smiths failed
to prove the police officers had violated that right based on the
facts alleged in the complaint.143 As stated by the majority of
circuit courts, the First Amendment protects recording of police
activity not only as a form of expressive activity, but also in
support of First Amendment principles by promoting the
discussion of governmental affairs.144
B. Eighth Circuit Holding Recordation Right Does Not Exist
Most recently, the Eighth Circuit, in Akins v. Knight, upheld a
lower court ruling that citizens do not have a First Amendment
right to videotape the police or any public official in public.145
Matthew Akins of Columbia, Missouri claimed the local police
department retaliated against him after multiple attempts to record
police activity.146 While videotaping the encounters, Akins
typically stood on public property, such as a street or sidewalk.147
Based on previous interactions with the police, Akins formed a
group called Citizens for Justice in 2010, which aimed to
document and report on police activity.148 Akins regularly
videotaped police activity and posted the videos onto the Missouri
police department Facebook website on several occasions.149 In
142

See id.; see also supra note 73 and accompanying text.
See Smith, 55 F.3d at 1333.
144
See supra Sections II.A.1–6.
145
See 863 F.3d 1084, 1088 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (affirming grant of summary
judgment motion to dismiss complaint on constitutional grounds).
146
See Akins v. City of Columbia, No. 2:15-CV-04096-NKL, 2016 WL 4126549, at
*16–17 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 2, 2016).
147
See, e.g., id. at *7.
148
See Akins, 863 F.3d at 1085; Akins, 2016 WL 4126549, at *6. Akins founded the
technology-based “interactive community resource” based on his frustrations with local
police officers. See Brad Racino, Citizens for Justice Keep Watchful Eyes on
Columbia Police Department, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN (Feb. 13, 2012),
https://www.columbiamissourian.com/news/citizens-for-justice-keep-watchful-eyes-oncolumbia-police-department/article_895281f4-a37e-5f8a-9c14-be38f26747a9.html
[https://perma.cc/A6ZP-G5A5]. Previous encounters with law enforcement officers
solidified Akins’s belief that many police officers often overstepped their authority. See
id. Thus, Akins founded this organization to not only hold police accountable, but also to
support local activism in police reform. See id.
149
See Akins, 2016 WL 4126549, at *8.
143
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2011, Akins was in the police department lobby and attempted to
film a person wearing a Ku Klux Klan hood.150 While filming, he
was instructed to stop and ultimately complied.151 Approximately
four years later, “[i]n October 2015, the Police Department held an
invitation-only ‘Media Training Day,’” only inviting traditional
media members due to space limitations.152 Despite not receiving
an invitation, Akins attempted to RSVP to the event, but organizers
informed him that he was not invited and could not attend.153
Akins filed suit against Boone County Prosecutor, Dan Knight,
and several Columbia police officers, citing violations of his First
Amendment right, among other miscellaneous claims.154 The U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Missouri ruled that
Akins, and by extension, any citizen or member of the traditional
press—i.e.,
individuals
representing
traditional
media
organizations—have no right to record the activities of public
officials on public property.155 Akins appealed the decision,
arguing that the district court judge should have recused herself
from the case, and the lower court erred in “granting the
defendant’s motion to dismiss and for summary judgment.”156 The
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.157 In affirming
the lower court’s decision, the Eighth Circuit also affirmed the
district court’s finding that Akins had no right to film
police activity.158

150

See id. at *7.
See id.
152
Id. at *8.
153
See id.
154
See Akins v. Knight, 863 F.3d 1084, 1085 (8th Cir. 2017).
155
See Akins, 2016 WL 4126549, at *17 (finding Akins “has no constitutional right to
videotape any public proceeding he wishes to”); see also id. (“[N]either the public nor the
media has a First Amendment right to videotape, photograph, or make audio recordings
of government proceedings that are by law open to the public.” (citing Rice v. Kempker,
374 F.3d 675, 678 (8th Cir. 2004))).
156
Akins, 863 F.3d at 1086.
157
See id. at 1088.
158
See id.; see also supra note 155 and accompanying text.
151
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III.

PROPOSAL FOR THE SUPREME COURT TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF
THE CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO RECORD
Whether it intended to or not, the Eighth Circuit decision
contradicts other circuit courts by holding that the right to record
police officers in public does not exist.159 Considering the
importance of this right, especially in relation to the underlying
First Amendment cornerstone of free discussion of governmental
affairs, the Supreme Court must overrule any lower court decision
endangering this right. Without this right, citizens in the Eighth
Circuit are stripped of an important mechanism to hold the police
accountable for their activities. Section III.A proposes that the act
of video recording official public police activity qualifies as
speech, thereby entitling it to First Amendment protections.160
Section III.B explains that because of this constitutional protection,
citizens have the right to disseminate these recordings.161 Finally,
Section III.C explains that the societal benefits far outstrip the
potential negative consequences of these recordings.162
A. Act of Recording Amounts to Speech Triggering First
Amendment Protections
The First Amendment protects video recordings because
“conduct is necessary to produce speech,”163 and courts have
“increasingly recognize[d] that the antecedent process of speech

159

See supra Part II.
See infra, Section III.A.
161
See infra, Section III.B.
162
See infra, Section III.C.
163
Clay Calvert, The Right to Record Images of Police in Public Places: Should Intent,
Viewpoint, or Journalistic Status Determine First Amendment Protection?, 64 UCLA L.
REV. DISCOURSE 230, 241 (2016). The Supreme Court has recognized some First
Amendment protection for the speech process, and not merely the expressive end
product. See infra notes 166–78 and accompanying text. First Amendment jurisprudence
separates speech from conduct. See Randall P. Bezanson, Is There Such a Thing as Too
Much Free Speech?, 91 OR. L. REV. 601, 601 (2012) (emphasizing that the First
Amendment guarantee of free speech traditionally “has rested on two fundamental
boundaries: speech versus conduct and liberty versus utility”); Martin H. Redish, Fear,
Loathing, and the First Amendment: Optimistic Skepticism and the Theory of Free
Expression, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 691, 700 (2015) (addressing “the fundamental distinction
between speech and conduct”).
160
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creation” deserves protection.164 The Ninth Circuit in Anderson v.
City of Hermosa Beach confronted the issue of First Amendment
protections for alternative conceptualizations of speech.165 In
Anderson, Johnny Anderson, a tattoo artist, attempted to open a
tattoo parlor in Hermosa Beach, California, a city with a preexisting municipal ordinance effectively banning tattoo parlors.166
Anderson alleged that the ordinance violated his First and Fourth
Amendment rights167 The Ninth Circuit reasoned:
Neither the Supreme Court nor our court has ever
drawn a distinction between the process of creating
a form of pure speech (such as writing or painting)
and the product of these processes (the essay or the
artwork) in terms of the First Amendment
protection afforded. Although writing and painting
can be reduced to their constituent acts, and thus
described as conduct, we have not attempted to
disconnect the end product from the act
of creation.168
The Ninth Circuit thus concluded that the First Amendment
protected the entire process of tattooing—beginning with the act of
creation—as a form of expressive activity.169 Because little to no
time lag exists between the act of pushing the record button “and
the result[ing] image[,]” the First Amendment—similar to
tattoos—protects video recordings as a form of expressive activity,
from its moment of creation.170 No legal difference exists
separating the unprotected act of recording from the speech it
immediately produces.171
164

Calvert, supra note 163, at 241. See, e.g., Buehrle v. City of Key West, 813 F.3d
973, 978 (11th Cir. 2015); Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th
Cir. 2010); Coleman v. City of Mesa, 284 P.3d 863, 870 (Ariz. 2012).
165
See Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1055 (noting that the case is one of first impression,
involving the First Amendment protections for tattoo parlors).
166
See id.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 1061–62 (emphasis in original).
169
See id. at 1060 (“The tattoo itself, the process of tattooing, and even the business of
tattooing are not expressive conduct but purely expressive activity fully protected by the
First Amendment.” (emphasis in original)); see also Calvert, supra note 163, at 234.
170
See Calvert, supra note 163, at 234.
171
See id.
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court has consistently viewed film
as deserving of First Amendment protections.172 Therefore, the
First Amendment protects the act of making film, as “there is no
fixed First Amendment line between the act of creating speech and
the speech itself.”173 Because recording the police activity is
necessary for the film’s creation, the First Amendment protects this
prior act of recordation.174 If the preliminary act of recordation was
unprotected, the accompanying First Amendment rights of
publication or broadcast would be essentially valueless.175 Within
First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has rejected
narrow definitions of “speech” or “press,” finding both terms to be
expansive given the importance of this right in American
society.176 Perhaps most significantly, the Supreme Court found
that in the absence of these broader surrounding rights, specifically
enumerated rights would be more vulnerable.177 If the First
Amendment failed to protect the recording of public police actions,

172

Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 688 (5th Cir. 2017); see also Kingsley
Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959) (“[T]he First
Amendment’s basic guarantee is of freedom to advocate ideas. The State, quite simply,
has thus struck at the very heart of constitutionally protected liberty.”); Superior Films,
Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Ohio, 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(“Motion pictures are of course a different medium of expression than the public speech,
the radio, the stage, the novel, or the magazine. But the First Amendment draws no
distinction between the various methods of communicating ideas.”); Burstyn v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (“[W]e conclude that expression by means of motion pictures is
included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First . . . Amendment[].”).
173
Turner, 848 F.3d at 688–89 (quoting ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 596
(7th Cir. 2012)); see also Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 596 (citing Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1061–
62), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012).
174
See Calvert, supra note 163, at 243.
175
Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 595 (“The act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is
necessarily included within the First Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press rights
as a corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting recording. The right to publish or
broadcast an audio or audiovisual recording would be insecure, or largely ineffective, if
the antecedent act of making the recording is wholly unprotected . . . .”
(emphasis in original)).
176
See Calvert, supra note 163, at 244; see also supra note 50 and accompanying text
(explaining the concept of penumbral rights); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 482 (1965) (“The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to
utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, [and] the right to read.”).
177
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–83; see also Calvert, supra note 163, at 244.
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the very existence of the resulting images, and free speech by
proxy, would be threatened as well.178
B. Right to Disseminate Recordings of Police Activity
Citizens can disseminate recordings of police activity because
any interference would constitute an unconstitutional restraint on
speech.179 In N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court
criticized interfering with the dissemination of information.180 As
discussed above, such restraints on dissemination relate to the prior
act of recording public police activity.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Black noted the Founding
Fathers sought to prevent the government from censoring the press
to prevent the government from abusing its power.181 In the age of
constant connectivity and the twenty-four-hour news cycle,
citizens recording and disseminating such information functions as
the same check on government abuse as traditional news outlets.182
However,
because
an
overarching
presumption
of
unconstitutionality remains,183 essentially any restriction on
disseminating information is presumptively invalid.
C. Laws Negatively Impacting the Citizen’s Right to Record
Are Unconstitutional
The First Amendment prevents the government from restricting
speech based on “its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.”184 Therefore, laws attempting to limit the citizen’s right
to record affect constitutionally protected speech rights. Statutes
178

See Calvert, supra note 163, at 244.
See Jacqueline G. Waldman, Note, Prior Restraint and the Police: The First
Amendment Right to Disseminate Recordings of Police Behavior, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV.
311, 343–45 (2014).
180
403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
181
See id. at 717. If the press is not “free and unrestrained,” it cannot “effectively
expose deception in government.” Id. See also Waldman, supra note 179, at 322.
182
See id. at 324–26, 333.
183
See id. at 323; see, e.g., N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“Our cases, it is true, have indicated that there is a single, extremely narrow class of
cases in which the First Amendment’s ban on prior judicial restraint may
be overridden.”).
184
ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 603 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v.
ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012).
179
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that impose liability on citizens recording police action impede
speech by restricting the “use of common instruments of
communication.”185 Regulating the use of a recording device in
regard to a particular subject (i.e., police officers) “suppresses
speech just as effectively as restricting the [later] dissemination of
a recording.”186 Criminalizing the recording of police interactions
“necessarily limits” later access to that information, inevitably
impinging on First Amendment rights.187 Accordingly, if a statute
“interferes with the gathering and dissemination of information
about [police officers] performing their duties,”188 it is subject to
strict scrutiny as a result of its impact on First Amendment
principles.189 Laws that restrict speech based on its content are
facially invalid; therefore, the burden shifts to the government to
overcome this presumption of unconstitutionality.190

185

Id. at 600 (“In short, the eavesdropping statute restricts a medium of expression—
the use of a common instrument of communication—and thus an integral step in the
speech process. As applied here, it interferes with the gathering and dissemination of
information about government officials performing their duties in public. Any way you
look at it, the eavesdropping statute burdens speech and press rights and is subject to
heightened First Amendment scrutiny.”).
186
Id. at 596.
187
See id. at 597.
188
Id. at 600.
189
See id. at 603. The Alvarez court stated that “[u]nlike the federal wiretapping statute
and the eavesdropping laws of most other states, the gravamen of the Illinois
eavesdropping offense [was] not the secret interception of surreptitious recording of a
private communication.” Id. at 595. The court reasoned that the statute did not
sufficiently advance the State’s interest in protecting conversational privacy. See id. at
606. Instead, the court held the Illinois statute was much broader, banning “all audio
recording of any oral communication absent consent of the parties regardless of whether
the communication is or was intended to be private.” Id. at 595 (emphasis in original).
The court concluded that “[t]he expansive reach of th[e] statute [wa]s hard to reconcile
with basic speech and press freedoms.” Id. The court rejected the State Attorney’s
argument that the broad sweep of this statute was legitimized by the government’s
interest in protecting conversational privacy, noting that this interest was not implicated,
and the application of the statute would likely fail even under a relatively lenient
intermediate standard of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral burdens of speech.
See id. at 586–87.
190
See id. at 603 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010)).
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D. Police Officers Performing Their Official Duties in Public
Have No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The Katz test applies to police officers in evaluating whether
police officers have a privacy interest when performing their duties
in public.191 The test, so applied, functionally collapses into a
single inquiry: can a police officer reasonably expect his public
actions will not be recorded?192 If police officers are found to
possess this requisite privacy interest, their activities would be
protected from recording.193
As a matter of law, most public interactions with police
officers lack a reasonable expectation of privacy.194 This
diminished privacy expectation is anchored in Katz, such “that
knowing[ly] expos[ing] a conversation to the public is tantamount
to . . . surrender[ing its] constitutional protection.”195 In fact, courts
have generally concluded that people conversing in open and
public spaces have no objective privacy expectation.196 Of utmost
importance, the Court held that communications during traffic
stops—comparatively a smaller and more contained interaction—
are akin to open and public conversations, and thus, may receive
no justifiable Fourth Amendment protection.197
191

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(enumerating what would come to be adopted as the Katz test, and providing that a
“person,” which would include a police officer, has a reasonable expectation of privacy).
192
See, e.g., Hornberger v. Am. Broad. Cos., 799 A.2d 566, 592 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2002) (applying the Katz test to police officers).
193
See id.
194
See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438 (1984); Kee v. City of Rowlett,
247 F.3d 206, 217 n.21 (5th Cir. 2001); Hornberger, 799 A.2d at 593.
195
Jesse Harlan Alderman, Police Privacy in the iPhone Era?: The Need for
Safeguards in State Wiretapping Statutes to Preserve the Civilian’s Right to Record
Public Police Activity, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 487, 516–17 (2011). See Katz,
389 U.S. at 351.
196
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); see also
Kee, 247 F.3d at 217 n.21; Wishart v. McDonald, 500 F.2d 1100, 1113–14 (1st Cir. 1974)
(finding “[t]he right of privacy . . . may be surrendered by public display”); Hornberger,
799 A.2d at 593.
197
See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437–38; see also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48
(1970). In Chambers, the Court held that individuals usually lack an objective
expectation of privacy in an automobile because cars are exposed to the public. See
Chambers, 399 U.S. at 48. Additionally, vehicles can be moved quickly and therefore it
is not practical to require officers to secure a warrant. See id.
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Additional factors also weigh against an objective privacy
expectation for police.198 Because police must later report their
official communications, any privacy expectation is necessarily
diluted.199 Under Katz, an officer’s duty to accurately report his
actions—whether at trial or elsewhere—creates exposure, thereby
eliminating any privacy right the officer may have against
recordation.200 Furthermore, witnesses to a police interaction “are
regularly called into court to repeat or testify about the
encounter.”201 Thus, under Justice Harlan’s Katz two-part test, a
police officer in public has no reasonable expectation of privacy.202
As detailed by numerous courts, police officers, in the public
performance of their duties, have no reasonable expectation of
privacy.203 “[T]he public interest in detecting, punishing, and
deterring crime” outweighs the privacy rights of police officers
acting in their official law-abiding capacity.204 Therefore, police
officers in public lack the requisite privacy interest to qualify for
protection under state and federal wiretapping statutes.205
E. Benefits of Recordings Trigger Protection
Numerous arguments support citizens recording police activity.
Recordings of police activity can provide probative evidence in
criminal cases, ensure civil rights claims are properly upheld, and
allow the public to hold the police accountable.206

198

See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
Kee, 247 F.3d at 214 (listing six nonexclusive factors to evaluate subjective
expectation of privacy which include, inter alia, “the potential for communications
to be reported”).
200
See id. at 214–15.
201
See Alderman, supra note 195, at 516–17.
202
See Kee, 247 F.3d at 215 (summing up a framework of factors for the Katz test
applied to officers that implicates a dearth of reasonable privacy expectations).
203
See id.; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; Commonwealth v. Henlen, 564 A.2d 905,
906–07 (Pa. 1989); Hornberger v. Am. Broad. Cos., 799 A.2d 566, 595 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2002); State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1357–58 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
204
See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 598–600 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 651 (2012). Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700 (1972).
205
See Hornberger, 799 A.2d at 595; see also Henlen, 564 A.2d at 907; Flora, 845
P.2d at 1358.
206
Alderman, supra note 195, at 525–26.
199
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1. Video Evidence Provides Probative Evidence in
Criminal Cases
“[I]t is increasingly common for dispositive evidence in
criminal trials to come from common mobile devices.207 However,
wiretapping statutes pose a dangerous problem in states that
prohibit . . . recording.”208 Wiretapping statutes would effectively
suppress video or audio evidence instead of providing additional
evidence relevant for the prosecution or defense.209 State laws that
bar recordings would then hinder the prosecution of police officers,
even if the misconduct could have been captured on tape.210
Unfortunately, if a statute criminalizes third-party recording, police
officers could charge the civilian recorder, and escape
accountability in the event of wrongdoing.211 In other words,
criminal trials might exclude “exculpatory evidence collected in
violation of wiretapping statutes,” preventing “true justice” from
being served.212 By allowing citizens to record, the potential
evidentiary value for trial will benefit society by helping to convict
guilty parties and assist in the exoneration of innocent individuals.
2. Vindication of Civil Rights in Section 1983 Claims
Laws preventing police officers from being publicly recorded
effectively exempt law enforcement from liability, even though
207

See, e.g., Timothy Williams, Recorded on a Suspect’s Hidden MP3 Player, a Bronx
Detective Faces [Twelve] Perjury Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/07/nyregion/07cop.html
[https://perma.cc/DAB9-PN7T].
208
Alderman, supra note 195, at 526; see, e.g., supra notes 121–30 (noting the ACLU’s
perceived need for a preliminary injunction against such a statute before commencing a
police accountability program); see also Project Veritas Action Fund v. Conley, 244 F.
Supp. 3d 256, 259 (D. Mass. 2017) (holding one such law from Massachusetts
unconstitutional (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99 (West 1968))).
209
See Alderman, supra note 195, at 526; see also supra note 208 and
accompanying text.
210
See generally Alderman, supra note 195, at 525–30 (providing examples of
incidents where video evidence proved to be uniquely probative).
211
See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 971–72 (Mass. 2001) (Marshall, C.J.,
dissenting) (“[H]ad police beaten Rodney King in Massachusetts” (prior to the holding in
Conley, 244 F. Supp.3d at 259), “it might have been George Holliday, the recorder, rather
than the four abusive officers, charged in the aftermath of the incident,” with his crime
being “‘secretly’ recording police without consent.”).
212
Alderman, supra note 195, at 527.

668

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXVIII:637

Congress enacted section 1983 to provide citizens with legal
recourse if their constitutional rights were infringed upon.213
However, Section 1983 claims are civil, requiring the plaintiff to
allege that they have suffered a constitutional deprivation by a
preponderance of the evidence.214 Given the potential impact of
video and audio recordings, such evidence should be admitted
when, otherwise, it might be excluded from being added to the
evidentiary record.215
The Supreme Court has admitted the value of such recordings,
finding videos to create a near perfect evidentiary record, even in
preliminary court proceedings.216 In Scott v. Harris, the Supreme
Court dismissed a section 1983 action, which alleged a law
enforcement official intentionally drove his car into the suspect’s
car for the purpose of arrest.217 The legal issue concerned whether
the intentional collision violated the individual’s Fourth
Amendment right of freedom from “unreasonable seizure.”218
Although the appellate court is required to view the facts “most
favorable to the non-moving party,”219 Justice Scalia found an
“added wrinkle in this case: existence in the record of a videotape
capturing the events in question.”220 The Court stated that when a
recording contained applicable and dispositive proof, the fact
finder should incorporate this evidence into its ruling.221 Justice
Scalia considered the value of this video evidence to be
particularly probative, arguing that “[t]he Court of Appeals should
not have rel[ied] on [the plaintiff’s] visible fiction,” rather, the
lower court “should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by
213

See id. at 528; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (creating a private right of action
for persons whose constitutional liberties are violated by persons acting under color of
state law).
214
See Alderman, supra note 195, at 529.
215
See generally Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (concerning a motorist who
brought a section 1983 claim against police officers for allegedly using excessive force,
in a case where a police recording was essentially dispositive).
216
See id. at 380–81.
217
See id. at 374–76.
218
Id. at 375–76.
219
Id. at 380; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
220
See Harris, 550 U.S. at 378.
221
Id. at 380–81 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 586–87 (1986)).
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the videotape.”222 The overall benefit of allowing citizens to record
police activity helps create reliable video evidence, and thus,
would support a Supreme Court decision finding this right to exist.
3. Need for Symmetry and Police Reform
Symmetry of power dynamics must exist between police
figures and the general public, “which favor recordation of
custodial interrogations, confessions, and . . . field stops from
cameras mounted on patrol cars.”223 In the United States, police
reform advocates have successfully encouraged lawmakers to
require confessions, interrogations, and identifications to be
recorded.224 In addition, some jurisdictions have voluntarily
introduced systemic recordings for the range of interpersonal
interactions to comply with social norms.225 This increased power
balance between police forces and the general public further
supports the finding of the First Amendment right to record
police activity.
Recording police activity can bring about cohesion and
solidarity between police forces and the public, which would create
a positive net benefit to society.226 The impact of distrust between
police officers and society is significant, resulting in decreased
compliance with and trust of law enforcement.227 It is possible to
build trust through transparent information sharing.228
Transparency not only minimizes distrust of law enforcement but
also allows for increased cooperation in civil society.229 For wider
society to trust the government and police, citizens must be
allowed to communicate their experiences and share information,
instead of being criminalized for attempting to exercise this free
222

Id.
Alderman, supra note 195, at 525–26.
224
Id. at 530–31.
225
Id.
226
See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126
YALE L.J. 2054, 2083 (2017); see also Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV.
1107, 1120–31 (2000) (describing the democratic bases for increasing availability of
governmental information about policing).
227
See Luna, supra note 226, at 1158–60.
228
See id. at 1163.
229
Id. at 1159–60, 1163–64.
223
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speech right.230 If police interactions follow official guidelines and
rules, data and transparency can further solidify the relationship
between officers and communities.231
CONCLUSION
Fundamental and practical evidentiary value exists in
recordings of public police activity. Any government ability to
prevent recordings of its own activities or suppression of a
citizen’s innocence is deeply problematic. Moreover, recordings of
encounters between civilians and law enforcement often produce
reliable evidence, which can increase trust in the criminal justice
system. Given this issue’s importance, in addition to the impact on
the First and Fourth Amendments, the current circuit split requires
intervention from the Supreme Court. The Founding Fathers’
emphasis on free speech and resulting protections afforded to it
reflect its importance in American legal jurisprudence. Therefore,
as the majority of circuit courts have stated, the First Amendment
protects civilians’ right to record police officials performing their
duties in public. This constitutional classification not only protects
the recording in future dissemination but also protects the
recording from statutes trying to infringe upon this right. Further,
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence indicates police officers have no
reasonable expectation of privacy when publicly performing their
official duties. Finally, courts should strictly scrutinize any
regulatory statute attempting to interfere with this right to record to
promote the exercise of free speech and transparent democracy.

230

Id. at 1164.
See id. at 2144. See generally Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria
Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 103 (1988).
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